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Abstract
Market manipulation is a strategy used by traders to
alter the price of financial securities. One type of ma-
nipulation is based on the process of buying or selling
assets by using several trading strategies, among them
spoofing is a popular strategy and is considered illegal
by market regulators. Some promising tools have been
developed to detect manipulation, but cases can still be
found in the markets. In this paper we model spoofing
and pinging trading, two strategies that differ in the le-
gal background but share the same elemental concept of
market manipulation. We use a reinforcement learning
framework within the full and partial observability of
Markov decision processes and analyse the underlying
behaviour of the manipulators by finding the causes of
what encourages the traders to perform fraudulent ac-
tivities. This reveals procedures to counter the problem
that may be helpful to market regulators as our model
predicts the activity of spoofers.
1 Introduction
Market microstructure is a branch of finance concerned with
analysis of the trading process arising from the exchange of
assets under a given set of rules (O’Hara 1998). In double
auction markets, this exchange of assets is done when the
buy and sell sides agree on the amount to pay/receive for the
trade, but this agreement depends on the different strategies
implemented by both sides. A trading strategy is by itself
a plan of actions designed to achieve profitable returns by
buying or selling financial assets (Pardo 2008).
While trading strategies are meant to follow the well es-
tablished rules of the markets, some traders prefer to misbe-
have and take advantage of others by manipulating the price
of the assets being traded. For instance, some traders can ma-
nipulate by spreading false information to other market par-
ticipants or by taking actions that may affect the perceived
price (Allen and Gale 1992), just as the case of the strat-
egy called pump and dump. Others, on the contrary, prefer
to take actions directly involved in the exchange of the as-
sets by artificially inflating or deflating the price in order to
obtain profits. Several manipulative strategies based on the
trading process are well known in the financial argot and
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have names like ramping, wash trading, quote stuffing, lay-
ering, spoofing, among others. Spoofing is one of the most
popular strategies that uses non-bona fide orders to improve
the price and is considered illegal by market regulators (Ak-
tas 2013). A similar strategy used by high-frequency traders
(HFTs) is called pinging where HFTs place orders without
the intention of execution, but to find liquidity not displayed
in the order book (where all buy and sell orders are listed
in double auction markets), and has caused controversy as it
can be viewed as a manipulative strategy (Scopino 2015).
Studies found in the literature that analyse the problem
of market manipulation have mainly focused on the devel-
opment of methods for detection. However, there has been
little analysis on the behaviour of market manipulators, an
area that may reveal the cause of why these economic agents
take such actions, thus examining this might be helpful for
market regulators to develop counter-measures that may dis-
courage or preclude fraudulent strategies
We propose to model spoofing and pinging strategies in
the context of portfolio growth maximisation, i.e., the ex-
pected capital appreciation over time of an investment ac-
count. We use a reinforcement learning agent that simu-
lates the behaviour of the spoofing trader in the context of
Markov decision processes (MDP), while a partially observ-
able MDP is used to model the pinging trader since the latter
involves hidden state in the order book. We use a fixed en-
vironment where transitions and rewards do not change in
time, but the agent has the option to transition between “two
different” state representations that, both combined, are the
full state representation of the environment that simulates
the manipulation process.
Our contribution is to show how these manipulative trad-
ing strategies can be modelled in a (PO)MDP framework
and how this reveals the causes of market manipulation in
terms of the incentives present in the market, and the dy-
namics of how it operates. From this, we aim to examine
two main questions: i) can spoofing and pinging modelled
by and MDP and POMDP respectively, be optimal strategies
when compared to honest behavior while seeking for growth
maximisation? ii) If the manipulative strategies are optimal,
which mechanisms can market regulators implement in or-
der to discourage or disincent traders taking such behaviour?
The results of this yield recommendations to market regula-
tors as to how to stop manipulative behaviour.
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2 Related Work
Research on price manipulation has been done using several
approaches. Some authors have developed analytical models
with the intention to investigate manipulative strategies per-
formed by large traders under the hypothesis of stochastic
economies with finite/infinite horizon and time dependent
price processes (Jarrow 1992). Others take a continuous-
time economy with risky and risk free assets and different
agents involved in a game where predatory trading (trading
style that takes advantage of other investors’ needs) leads to
price overshooting and amplifies the selling cost and default
risk of large traders (Brunnermeier and Pederse 2005). Oth-
ers consider the problem where manipulative uninformed
traders can profit by selling a given firm’s stock, thus pro-
viding a starting point to restrict short selling (when traders
sell a security not owned) (Goldstein and Guembel 2008).
Other researchers have focused in the application of data
driven approaches with the aim to present empirical evi-
dence of stock price manipulation under the assumption of
the presence of arbitrageurs or information seekers acting ra-
tionally (Aggarwal and Wu 2006) or by finding unusual pat-
terns of trading activities and systematic profitability based
on market timing and liquidity performed by brokers in
emerging markets (Khwaja and Mian 2005). An agency-
based model is tested with empirical data where brokers ma-
nipulate the closing price to influence his customer’s percep-
tion about his performance (Hillion and Suominen 2004).
Also, behavioural stances have been mixed with theoret-
ical and data driven approaches. An analytical framework
is developed that describes trade-based manipulation as an
intentional act to produce changes in the price and obtain a
profit, so one could clarify what does and does not constitute
manipulation (Ledgerwood and Carpenter 2012). Evidence
of trade-based manipulation and its effects on investor be-
haviour and market efficiency is provided, where the manip-
ulator pretends to act as an informative trader that may affect
the reaction of other investors (Kong and Wang 2014).
Furthermore, discriminative models are intended to de-
tect market manipulation based on empirical data. By us-
ing economic and statistical analysis it is possible to detect
manipulation ex post, suggesting that the existence of reg-
ulatory framework may be inefficient (Pirrong 2004). Ma-
chine learning techniques have also been applied for detec-
tion of manipulation. Based on trading data, some authors
suggest that Artificial Neural Networks and Support Vec-
tor Machines are effective techniques to detect manipula-
tion (O¨gˇu¨t, Dogˇanay, and Aktas¸ 2009). Others suggest that a
method called “hidden Markov model with abnormal states”
is capable to model and detect price manipulation patterns,
but further calibration is necessary (Cao et al. 2013). Data
mining methods for detecting intraday price manipulation
have been used to classify and identify patterns linked to
market manipulation at different time scales, but further re-
search is needed to address the challenge on detecting the
different forms of manipulation (Dı´az-Solı´s, Theodoulidis,
and Sampaio 2011). Furthermore, Naı¨ve Bayes is a good
classifier for predicting potential trades associated to mar-
ket manipulation (Golmohammadi, Zaiane, and Dı´az 2014).
For the case of spoofing trading, detection can be done with
the implementation of supervised learning algorithms (Cao
et al. 2014), or can be identified by modelling trading deci-
sions as MDPs and using Apprenticeship Learning to learn
the reward function (Yang et al. 2012).
Though research is extensive in the area of market ma-
nipulation, few develop generative models of what encour-
ages these economic agents to follow the disruptive strate-
gies. Furthermore, few of them provide recommendations
to regulatory entities and/or firms (Rossi et al. 2015) to en-
courage traders to stop this harmful behaviour. Different to
the discriminative models that are intended to distinguish
the manipulative behaviour from other strategies, we use the
(PO)MDP approach to model spoofing/pinging as it predicts
the behavior of manipulators in terms of the market condi-
tions, thus providing a powerful tool that can be used by
market regulators to counter the manipulative strategies.
3 Problem Formulation
3.1 Trading in a Bull Market
In this work we are focused on modelling two trade-based
market manipulation strategies as follows. Suppose there is
a trader managing an investment portfolio in behalf of a bro-
kerage firm and has the objective to get high trading profits
that may produce portfolio growth in the short/medium term.
Suppose the agent is trading in a futures market and the port-
folio consists of two different contracts, α and β, with a mar-
ket full of optimism so prices are rising (a situation known
as a bull market). Mathematically, the capital of the invest-
ment account at given market tick t ∈ [0, T ] (where a tick
represents the execution of a new trade in the market, either
from the trader or any other participant) can be written as
It = at + ct, (1)
where at = aαt + a
β
t is the capital associated to the mar-
ket value of the contracts α and β, and ct is the cash to
be used for future purchases of more contracts. The vari-
able at changes at every tick since the prices of the con-
tracts are following a trend, while ct changes due to cash
inflows/outflows (by the sale/purchase of contracts). The net
profit of the investment over a tick window [0, T ] is
R = GT −
T∑
t=0
ζt, (2)
where GT = IT − I0 is the investment growth, and ζt are
the direct transaction costs associated to the trading of the
contracts (such as exchange and government fees).
Under bull market conditions, one way in which the trader
can profit from the portfolio’s growth is with a simple buy
and hold strategy, an almost risk-free strategy whereby she
purchases contracts α and β and simply waits, in the long
term, for the prices to rise before selling for a profit. How-
ever, the trader may, alternatively, be aiming for a higher tar-
get growth G∗T in the short/medium term, requiring a more
active strategy than the “buy and hold”, i.e., buying and sell-
ing contracts α and β, subject to the transaction costs ζt.
For this, the trader can behave in several different ways.
First, the trader may trade honestly, i.e., following all the
market rules, by buying more contracts or selling them when
she believes is profitable. In this way, the invested capital
may appreciate and produce growth if such profits are larger
than the direct cost associated to the trading process ζt. Al-
ternatively, she may act as a manipulative trader to control
the price of the contracts in order to accelerate the growth
process and quickly reach the desired G∗T . In either case,
following the transaction, the trader ends up with a different
proportion of the contracts α and β, rebalancing the quan-
tities at and ct and thereby finds herself in a new level of
growth Gt at a given tick t.
This process is illustrated in Fig. 1 where the three strate-
gies are simulated on closing prices determined by the mar-
ket indexes S&P 500 and NASDAQ Composite for contracts
α and β, respectively, in the period February 27, 1995 to
May 5, 1995. Initially, the trader has 1,000 contracts in both
assets and the account’s capital value is 10 million monetary
units. While the market evolves, the trader takes actions rep-
resented by the filled (honest)/non-filled (manipulation) tri-
angles, reaching new levels of profit determined by changes
in the growth Gt and the payment of transaction costs, ζt.
In our simulation, the manipulative strategy has the best per-
formance, giving a signal that price manipulation is more
effective while maximising investment growth.
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Figure 1: A simulation of profits gained from different trad-
ing strategies during a bull market period.
However, transitioning in the different levels of growth
Gt by trading is possible only when a trade is executed. In
double auction markets this process can be performed when
the buying and selling prices match, so the exchange of as-
sets can proceed. This is known as liquidity and depends on
the degree of trading activity implemented by other market
participants. In our model, honest actions taken by the trader
can lead to no change in the level of growth Gt if liquidity
is poor in the contract to trade, but a manipulator can take
advantage of this situation by placing a large order that may
gain the interest of other market participants and start a pro-
cess of price improvement.
An illustrative example of growth maximisation is pro-
vided in Fig. 2, where we changed the notation of Gt to
st, t ∈ [0, 4], and G∗T to s∗. There, the four growth levels
correspond to holding a portfolio containing different pro-
portions of contracts, for example, in s1 the trader holds
one contract of type α and one contract β. If the trader
choses to buy a second α contract, i.e., action “Buy α” (↑),
she transitions to growth level s2 – holding two α con-
tracts and one β contract by paying the associated trans-
action costs ζ1. Similarly, if she then chooses to sell the
second α contract, i.e., action “Sell α” (↓), she will re-
turn to growth level s1, now paying ζ2 costs. These actions
define honest actions for the α contracts, with homologue
actions for contract β (“Buy β” (→) and “Sell β” (←)).
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Figure 2:
Idealised rep-
resentation
illustrating the
different levels
of st while
maximising
investment
growth.
Additionally, while in s2 taking actions
“Buy α” (↑) and “Sell β” (←), result in
no change in the level of growth. This
is due to orders placed by the trader that
were never filled because the price was
too high/low while trying to sell/buy the
β/α contract, a process that happens in all
of the edges of the grid. We are assuming
the trader only places limit orders, i.e., or-
ders with a fixed volume and price listed
in the order book according to the market
rules, so the agent’s orders will be filled
only when a counterpart exists, if not, then
the order is not executed and no transac-
tion costs ζt are added. Similarly, for ac-
tion “Buy β” (→) the trader faces the problem of poor liq-
uidity in the asset. We associate this obstacle (poor liquid-
ity) for the trader to the black square in the representation of
Fig. 2, with the option for the trader to try to manipulate the
asset’s price as a way to incentivize liquidity.
3.2 Price Manipulation by Spoofing
Spoofing is an illegal trading strategy used by traders in-
tended to manipulate the price of a given asset by placing
large orders (spoofing orders) without the intention of exe-
cution, but to give misleading information to other market
participants in terms of the asset’s supply and demand, thus
producing a change in the price (Lee, Eom, and Park 2013).
Once the price is affected, the trader cancels the spoofing
order and places the real order on the opposite trading side.
In our model, spoofing is illustrated as follows. Consider
the case that, by taking spoofing actions, the trader can over-
turn the lack of liquidity in the asset β and take advantage
of improved prices. In Fig. 3, this corresponds to the ob-
stacle switching from the top centre bin to the bottom cen-
tre bin, showing the effect of manipulation while purchas-
ing more contracts (the obstacle could switch to other cells,
but it will not allow to analyse the effects of manipulation in
terms of solving an optimisation problem as explained in the
next sections). This can yield gains for the trader, for exam-
ple, starting in s2, the trader can take action “Manipulative
Buy β (⇒)” – i.e., use spoofing to buy β, by placing a large
spoofing sell order for β, cancelling it, and then buying β at
an improved price. Once the obstacle to switch to the bottom
bin, the agent finds herself in s7, closer to s′∗.
The two representations in Fig. 3 have the same levels
of growth but with different conditions associated to market
liquidity, thus giving an idea of the effects of price manip-
ulation. This effect is related to market impact, where most
of honest traders will avoid it as it represents indirect ex-
tra costs, but for a manipulator like a spoofer it represents
profits that may accelerate the portfolio’s growth.
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Figure 3: Representat on illustrating the effect of the spoof-
ing in the process of investment growth maximisation.
3.3 Spoofing as a Markov Decision Process
A natural model of the scenario described in §3.2, is that
of a Markov Decision Process (MDP) (Nevmyvaka, Feng,
and Kearns 2006; Yang et al. 2012). In general, an MDP is
defined by the tuple {S,A, T,R}, where S and A are sets
of states and actions, respectively (s ∈ S and a ∈ A), R
is the set of rewards (r ∈ R), and T is a set of transition
probabilities ({P (s′|s, a)} ∈ T where P (s′|s, a) represents
the probability of transitioning to state s′ from s after action
a). Actions are taken according to the policy pi(s, a) that
defines the probability of taking action a in state s.
Considering the growth st as the state variable, the prob-
lem for the trader is to find the best strategy for buying and
selling contracts α and β, subject to the transaction costs
ζt, in order to achieve the target short/medium term growth
s∗. The complete set of states for spoofing is determined for
the state representation in Fig. 3 as it captures the differ-
ent levels of growth after taking any of the actions. These
actions are associated to the process of buying and selling
contracts and are used by the trader to navigate in/within the
state space of Fig. 3, being the honest action set determined
by A = {↑, ↓,←,→} and similarly the set of manipulative
actionsA = {⇑,⇓,⇐,⇒} (“Manipulative Buy α”, “Manip-
ulative Sell α”, “Manipulative Sell β”, “Manipulative Buy
β”, respectively), and the “do nothing” action for the “buy
and hold” A = {◦}, with A = A ∪A∪A. The rewards are
represented by the transaction costs ζt that may depend on
the action taken and the level of growth the trader is located
at. The transition probabilities are linked to the degree of liq-
uidity the contracts α and β have at a given tick t, so a good
degree of liquidity will help the trader’s orders to be filled
and transition to a new level of growth, while low liquidity
will restrict these transitions.
3.4 Price Manipulation by Pinging
Pinging is similar to spoofing as is defined as a limit or-
der placed inside the bid-ask spread (the price difference
between the best buy and sell quotes listed in the order
book) without the intention of execution, but cancelled al-
most instantly (Scopino 2015). This strategy is implemented
by HFTs by exploiting the speed advantage with the inten-
tion to ping the market in search of hidden liquidity, i.e., or-
ders that are not displayed in the order book as is the case of
large orders placed by institutional investors. This strategy
has a more complex succession of events – submit ping or-
ders and almost instantly cancel them, detect hidden liquid-
ity, take the liquidity on the trading side pursued by the large
investor and then place the real orders at improved prices.
In order to make pinging a successful strategy, HFTs must
be able to find hidden liquidity, a process that depends on
the ping orders that help to create a belief on the existence
of such liquidity. However, it is well known that investors
prefer to place large orders in dark pools, i.e., private venues
where the exchange of assets is not visible to the general
public, so no one can see who’s buying/selling, but whose
prices depends on the current market prices of well stab-
lished markets. This gives the HFT uncertainty about the
existence of hidden liquidity as it is not displayed in the or-
der book. In order to simulate this in the representation of
Fig. 4, we introduce the concept of observations that guides
the trader on the actions to take while being on a given state.
For example, having observation o2 while in level s2 means
that there is hidden liquidity (the obstacle) in the sell side
of the β contracts, so the HFT can produce profits by taking
control over the prices in the regulated market while trading
in the dark pool against the hidden liquidity. However, hav-
ing the same observation in level s6 means that such liquid-
ity does not exists and taking the manipulative action may
produce losses.
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Figure 4: Representation that illustrates pinging trading
while trying to maximise the growth of the investment.
3.5 Pinging as a Partially Observable Markov
Decision Process
Pinging, as described in §3.4, can be modelled with
a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
(POMDP) (Baffa and Ciarlini 2010). In general, the
POMDP is defined by the tuple {S,A, T,R,O,Ω}, that is,
the MDP tuple is extended with {O,Ω}, whereO represents
a set of observations (o ∈ O) and Ω is a set of observation
probabilities given states s and actions r ({O(o|s, r)}).
For the POMDP, actions are taken according to the agent’s
belief of being on a given state and is calculated according
to the observations.
Once more, every time a trader’s order is filled then the
correspondent transaction costs must be paid. Liquidity is
again the one that facilitates the trading of contracts α and
β, so the trader can transition to the different levels of growth
after the rebalance of capital. The observations represent the
trader’s detection of hidden liquidity (the obstacle) that may
help or be counterproductive while seeking profits.
4 Methodology
In both models, the trader has the objective to reach the
goal s∗ that represents the maximum investment growth and,
since this is a bull market, the highest profit comes from hav-
ing the most contracts, a process that can be performed by
navigating within the state representations (the opposite also
applies while in a bear market [when pessimism persist and
prices tend to fall], where the trader may prefer to sell con-
tracts). We have chosen the state representations as in Fig. 3
and Fig. 4 as both model a single agent’s behavior of acquir-
ing contracts during a bull market period, with the option
of taking either honest or manipulative actions as an “opti-
mal” behavior. Other grids with a more complex structure
may also reproduce optimality of trading strategies, but ma-
nipulative behavior may not emerge as an “optimal” action
according to the simulated market conditions, thus eliminat-
ing the core of the analysis we present in this paper.
Regardless of whether manipulative trading is permitted
or not, the best sequence of trading actions for the agent (op-
timal policy) can be determined in a straightforward manner
through, for example, reinforcement learning. In this paper,
for the MDP model this is achieved through simple value
iteration (Sutton and Barto 1998) to find the optimal value
function
V pi
∗
(s) = max
a∈A
[
R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a)V (s′)
]
, (3)
where 0 < γ < is the discount factor. The POMDP for-
malism is intended to model states not fully observable, ex-
plaining why an observation function is needed to solve the
problem. The observation function, Ω(a, s, o), is the prob-
ability of making observation o from state s after action
a (Kaelbling, Littman, and Cassandra 1998). For POMDP’s
the solution is to find optimal policies with actions that max-
imises the value function. Based on the agent’s current be-
liefs about the state (growth level), this value function can
be represented as a system of simultaneous equations as
V ∗(b) = max
a∈A
[
ρ(b, a) + γ
∑
b′∈B
τ(b, a, b′)V ∗(b′)
]
, (4)
where b ∈ B is a belief state, ρ(b, a) = ∑s∈S b(s)R(s, a)
are the expected rewards for the belief states; τ(b, a, b′) =∑
{o∈O|b=b′} P (o|a, b), the state transition function.
The optimal value function considers the potential re-
wards of actions taken in the future, so it captures the opti-
mal actions that generate the most of rewards over the long-
term. This argument enables us to examine the questions es-
tablished at the end of §1 by analising the optimal actions
in the (PO)MDP model ultimately determined by two fac-
tors: the reward and the transition functions. Whether ma-
nipulative strategies are optimal, by expanding the idea of
the reward function (transaction costs) and adding the no-
tion of “high fines/financial penalties” imposed by market
regulators, we argue this will encourage traders to stop the
misbehavior and play in a fair way. Additionally, we believe
that adding uncertainty to the effect of manipulation over
liquidity may represent another cause to discourage abusive
behavior and promote more efficient markets.
5 Experiments
In this section we present a simulation on the profitability of
the three strategies described in §3 and the optimal actions
in the (PO)MDP model in terms of portfolio growth optimi-
sation.
5.1 Simulation
First, we simulate the “buy and hold”, honest and spoofing
strategies during bull market periods, by taking market in-
dexes S&P 500 and NASDAQ Composite as the contracts
Table 1: Profitability simulated under a bull market.
Strategy Avg. profit (%) Std. dev.
Buy and Hold 5.83% 0.041925
Honest 6.85% 0.059576
Spoofing 7.68% 0.059576
α and β, respectively. We use closing prices for periods of
92 days, simulating a short term to produce profits. Table 1
shows the results of the simulation and we see that, in aver-
age, spoofing outperforms the other strategies, a result that
was produced by the increase of growth after taking manip-
ulative actions. Honest trading is the second best strategy,
beating the “buy and hold” as the later has good perfor-
mance in the long term. The next step is to analyse at which
point the optimality of manipulative actions appears in the
(PO)MDP models described in previous sections.
5.2 MDP Model for Spoofing
i. Is spoofing an optimal strategy?
Here we demonstrate whether spoofing occurs according to
the model described in §3.3 and, if it occurs, what are the
factors that encourages it. First, we try to model a market
where all participants play under the same conditions – all
strategies pay the same transaction costs, with the trader’s
actions outcome totally deterministic.
As a baseline, all honest actions in direction of the edge of
any of the states have zero costs and make the agent bounce
back to the same state. The same for manipulative actions,
except that the obstacle switches its position (thus changing
representation); otherwise, manipulative actions costs −1 in
all states. Transitioning within the different states costs −1
and colliding against the obstacle has 0/−1 costs for all hon-
est/ manipulative actions. The terminal states, s∗ and s′∗
have a reward of +1 meaning the trader has reached the de-
sired growth state. The “do nothing” (◦) action has zero costs
in all states, but the agent cannot transition. All transitions
are deterministic, meaning that P (s′|s, a) = 1, for all s, a.
We set γ = 0.95 and solve equation (3) to find the optimal
actions in the MDP model. Table 2 shows the results for the
baseline and we see that spoofing do occur in most of the
states, sharing optimality with honest actions. The results
reveal that while trading under the same conditions in terms
of transaction costs, spoofing can be exploited by traders in
order to gain profits and reach the desired level of growth.
ii. Adding financial penalties to spoofing
Now, we try to encourage the trader to behave honestly by
simulating market regulators imposing fines/financial penal-
ties to spoofers. For this, in the baseline described in §5.2.i.
we change the reward function and increase the costs to all
manipulative actions in all states up to −4.53 and use the
same value for γ to solve (3).
Once more, Table 2 shows the results of this setup and the
only optimal actions are those associated to honest trading.
There’s a clear difference between the two market condi-
tions from the regulatory point of view, one that considers a
free-fine market (baseline) and the other with fines imposed
to manipulators. For example, in the baseline starting from
Table 2: Optimal actions for the MDP model under different
conditions of the reward and transition functions.
State Baseline
Adding Adding uncertainty on liquidity
fines 50% vs. 50% 10% vs. 90%
s1 ↑,→,⇑ → ⇒ ⇒
s2 ⇒ ↓ ⇑,⇐ ↓
s3 →,⇑,⇒ → →,⇒ →,⇒
s4 ↑,⇑ ↑ ↑,⇑ ↑,⇑
s5 ↑,⇑,⇒ ↑ ↑ ↑
s6 → → → ⇒
s7 →,⇒ → →,⇒ →,⇒
s8 ↑,⇑ ↑ ↑,⇑ ↑,⇑
state s2 means for the spoofer takes only two steps to reach
s∗ (⇒ in s2; ⇒ in s7), while after imposing fines a honest
trader will take four steps (↓ in s2;→ in s1;→ in s3; and ↑
in s4) to reach the same level of growth.
iii. Adding uncertainty to liquidity
A second attempt to stop the spoofing behavior is by pro-
viding uncertainty to the effects of manipulation over liq-
uidity. This can be done by taking the baseline described in
§5.2.i. and changing the transition function for all manipu-
lative actions in all states. We take two different measures
of uncertainty: a 50%/50%–10%/90% chance for the obsta-
cle to switch/stagnates, with the aim to see which of these
measures eliminates spoofing.
We take the same value for γ and solve (3). Table 2 shows
the results in this new setup and we conclude that imple-
menting mechanism that somehow take control over liquid-
ity are not as effective as applying fines to manipulators.
Spoofing still occurs despite the effects over liquidity are
vague. However, we must notice that in both measures of
uncertainty, almost all the optimal actions (including spoof-
ing actions) are in the same direction of honest actions when
adding fines to spoofers, meaning that the effect over liquid-
ity is vague precisely because liquidity already exists in the
market, a consistent result with our model described in §3.1.
5.3 POMDP Model for Pinging
i. Is pinging an optimal strategy?
Here we demonstrate whether pinging emerges as an op-
timal strategy while maximising growth. First, we use the
same baseline as in §5.2.i. in terms of rewards and transitions
and the observations shown in Fig. 4. We set γ = 0.95 and
solve (4). Table 3 shows the results for the baseline in the
POMDP model, where pinging is the optimal action in all
observable states under equal conditions in terms of transac-
tion costs. Honest behavior is optimal only in observed state
o2, meaning that no matter the HFT actually observes (de-
tects) the hidden liquidity, she will take profits from other
investors that do not necessarily place large orders.
ii. Increasing transaction costs to pinging
We want to discourage HFTs to take pinging by changing
parameters that may influence trader’s decisions. As pinging
is not considered illegal, we take the changes in the reward
function equivalent to increasing the direct transaction costs
associated to pinging. We change the reward function for
Table 3: Optimal actions for the POMDP model under dif-
ferent conditions of the reward and transition functions.
Observed
Baseline
Increase Adding uncertainty on liquidity
State transaction costs 50% vs. 50% 10% vs. 90%
o1 ⇑ →, ↑ ↑ ↑,⇒
o2 ⇒,→ →, ↓ →,⇒ →,⇒, ↓
o3 ⇑ → → →
o4 ⇑ ↑ ↑ ↑
o5 ⇒ → → →
the POMDP model in the baseline considered in §5.3.i. and
increase the costs to all pinging actions up to −4.91 in all
states. We set γ = 0.95 and solve (4).
Table 3 shows the results for these changes and we see that,
under the new conditions pinging is no longer optimal as is
was in the baseline in §5.3.i., and only honest actions can be
taken by the trader. This means that the core of the business
related to pinging is no longer profitable because of the high
costs that must be paid to the correspondent parties – it may
be the case that pinging produce profits, but not large enough
to cover the transaction costs.
iii. Adding uncertainty to liquidity
Finally, a second attempt to stop pinging trading is by chang-
ing the transition function, a mechanism that applies uncer-
tainty to the potential effects of pinging over market liquid-
ity. We take the baseline as in §5.3.i. and the same transi-
tions described in §5.2.iii.. We set γ = 0.95 and solve (4).
Once more, Table 3 shows the results of these changes and
we see that, under mechanism that provide uncertainty to the
effect of pinging trades over liquidity, pinging is still an op-
timal action in some of the observed states, showing that is
more effective to increase the transaction costs as shown in
§5.3.ii., a similar result as in spoofing.
6 Conclusions
The results from the (PO)MDP models show they can pre-
dict behaviours, and both the manipulative and honest trad-
ing can co-exist in a regulated market where all participants
have the same direct costs. We found that both spoofing
and pinging trading are optimal investment strategies while
traders try to maximise the investment growth, but market
regulators can discourage the use of these strategies by im-
plementing mechanism over market liquidity, and this en-
forcement will be more efficient if fines are added (for spoof-
ing) or by increasing the direct transaction costs (pinging).
However, our model works on bull market conditions and
we expect to fit on bear markets if we change the side of
the trading actions. Other conditions where no trends exists
may produce incentives for manipulation as a way to move
the market. Furthermore, in pinging HFTs have the option
to avoid ping orders and analyse the predictability of the as-
set’s order flow with the goal to infer the existence of hidden
liquidity, thus saving direct transaction costs.
Further research can be focused on applying the models in
real market data and more complex portfolios, and verify the
effectiveness of the recommendations provided to disincent
manipulation performed by spoofing/pinging traders.
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